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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the properties of accounting numbers using a real investment framework
that predicts asymmetric timeliness of both investment and its outcomes (i.e. sales, earnings and
operating cash flows) even in the absence of conservative accounting. In particular, I predict and
find that firms are able to react more quickly to negative economic shocks (by cutting investment
and employment) than to positive economic shocks (where there is a lag in implementing new
investments or expanding employment). Next, I create the link between real investment and
operating decisions and accounting by examining properties of sales and cash sales. I focus on
analyzing sales and cash sales because real investment and operating activities are likely to have
a great impact on the timeliness and time-series properties of these variables. I hypothesize that
due to the slow investment adjustment to positive shocks, sales will exhibit a relatively stronger
sensitivity to negative versus positive shocks. I also predict that sales will reflect a positive shock
over time (positive autocorrelation) whereas a negative shock will be reflected in sales in a more
immediate and permanent fashion. I find strong empirical support for both predictions. Cross-
sectional tests lend further support to my hypothesis that real operating and investment activities
play a crucial role in determining the observed properties of accounting numbers.
Thesis Supervisor: S.P. Kothari
Title: Gordon Y Billard Professor of Accounting
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1. Introduction
This paper uses a real investment framework to develop predictions about a firm's
differential responses to positive and negative shocks to its investment opportunities. This
framework predicts asymmetric timeliness of investment and investment outcomes such as sales,
earnings and operating cash flows even in the absence of conservative accounting. In particular, I
predict and find evidence that firms are able to react more quickly to negative shocks (by cutting
investment and employment) than to positive shocks (where there is a lag in implementing new
investments or expanding employment).' This asymmetric timeliness of investment and
investment outcomes suggests a complementary explanation for the observed asymmetric
timeliness of earnings and cash flows first documented in Basu (1997). My findings suggest that
there will be an asymmetric relation between accounting numbers and stock returns even when
the accounting system is neutral in the recognition of changes to a firm's expected operating
performance. My findings expand our understanding of the properties of accounting numbers by
recognizing the role of managers' real actions on accounting numbers (versus solely accounting
recognition issues).2
The relation between accounting measures of performance and economic measures of
performance is a central issue in the accounting literature and has been extensively studied over
the past three decades. For example, Kothari and Sloan (1992) and Collins, Kothari, Shanken and
Sloan (1994) show that earnings contain information about firm performance but lack timeliness.
1 Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2006) examine the relation between investment sensitivity to shocks and
asymmetric timeliness of earnings. In their cross-country study, they argue that the asymmetric sensitivity of
investment to bad news is associated with timelier signals of deteriorating performance derived from the application
of conservative accounting. In this paper, I argue that asymmetric investment sensitivity to shocks exists at least
partially due to the presence of asymmetric investment adjustment costs such as securing financing and time-to-
build requirements. It should be noted that a conservative accounting system may also help reinforce the asymmetric
investment sensitivity described in my paper.
2 Hayn (1995) among others examines how real options such as the abandonment option affect the returns-earnings
relation.
In other words, prices lead earnings. Basu (1997) extends the literature by showing that earnings
are more informative when news is negative and attributes his findings to the application of
asymmetric recognition standards related to accounting conservatism. 3 These studies attribute the
slow timeliness and asymmetric timeliness of earnings to the nature of formal accounting rules
and the tendencies of accountants to apply objective, verifiable and conservative standards when
reporting accounting performance.
In this paper, I take a step back and examine the timeliness properties of the underlying
economic drivers of sales, earnings and cash flows, namely the firm's investing and operating
activities. Since operating and investing activities are ultimately the real drivers of a firm's sales,
earnings and cash flows, it is important to first examine their properties and how they contribute
to the properties of accounting numbers. Specifically, I provide a benchmark for the timeliness
properties of a firm's accounting numbers in the absence of asymmetric recognition issues.
The main idea is that investment and operating responses to positive economic shocks
lack timeliness due to planning, financing and time-to-build frictions inherent in the investment
process (Lamont, 2000). On the other hand, when a firm suffers a negative shock, operations and
investment can relatively quickly adjust to the negative economic shock. The implication is that
investment outcomes such as sales, operating cash flows and earnings will be slow in reflecting
positive news whereas negative news will be reflected in accounting reports in a relatively
timelier fashion.
This line of reasoning generates clear predictions about the timeliness and the time-series
properties of sales/cash sales; at the same time, the predictions on the properties of sales and cash
3 Basu (1997) also documents an asymmetric sensitivity of operating cash flow with negative stock returns.
However, he focuses on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings and does not offer an explanation about the
asymmetric timeliness of operating cash flow and how it fits into his conservatism framework. Dietrich, Muller and
Riedl (2006) also point out the asymmetric timeliness of operating cash flow documented in the Basu (1997) paper,
but they do not offer an explanation for the finding.
sales under the real investment framework are difficult to reconcile with an explanation based on
accounting conservatism. More specifically, sales are predicted to be timelier in reflecting
negative rather than positive shocks due to the slow investment adjustment to positive shocks. In
addition to the differential timeliness of sales to negative versus positive news, the investment
framework generates unique predictions about the time-series properties of sales. Negative
shocks are predicted to quickly and permanently impact sales whereas on the other hand, positive
shocks will tend to be reflected in sales over time. In summary, sales, earnings and operating
cash flow are predicted to exhibit a stronger sensitivity to negative news even in the absence of
asymmetric recognition applications. In addition to the real determinants of the properties of
accounting numbers, the application of asymmetric recognition standards will pronounce the
contemporaneous association between earnings and negative news.
Based on this intuition, I first develop and test hypotheses on firm's operating and
investing actions in response to economic shocks. I find evidence consistent with my hypotheses.
Using a variety of investment measures, I find a weak relation between investment and current
shocks and a much stronger relation between investment and shocks occurring up to three years
in the past. While investment sensitivity to contemporaneous positive shocks is weak, there is a
significant contemporaneous association between investment and negative shocks where capital
expenditures are immediately cut and employment immediately downsized in response to the
negative shock. I also find evidence of timely divestment by examining changes in PP&E in
response to negative shocks. This evidence is consistent with my prediction that asymmetric
frictions in the investment versus the divestment process lead to an asymmetric sensitivity of real
operating and investment activities with respect to contemporaneous shocks.
Next, I provide an intuitive framework linking real investment and operating activities
with sales, earnings and operating cash flows. I predict that the asymmetric sensitivity of
investment to negative versus positive shocks implies that sales will exhibit a relatively stronger
sensitivity to negative shocks. I find evidence supporting my prediction. More specifically, sales
activity (levels and changes specifications) is asymmetrically timelier to negative shocks due to
the presence of asymmetric investment lags. Moreover, sales adjusted for accounts receivable
exhibit an asymmetric timeliness of similar magnitude to the asymmetric timeliness found in net
sales. In unreported tests, I also adjust for the presence of deferred revenue in the net sales
number (a conservative application in revenue recognition) and my results are robust to such an
alternative specification. Overall, I find that sales are asymmetrically timely with respect to
negative shocks even after removing discretion applied in the net sales number.
The real investment framework also makes predictions about the time-series properties of
sales. Positive shocks are predicted to impact sales over time (because firms are unable to
immediately adjust their operating activity to higher levels) whereas negative shocks are
predicted to impact sales in a more immediate and permanent fashion. I find empirical support
for this prediction by showing that positive sales shocks are spread out over subsequent periods
whereas negative shocks are reflected in sales in a timelier and more complete fashion. I also
conduct the tests on the time-series properties of sales by using a sales number that is adjusted
for the presence of recognition effects found in accounts receivable and the results are
unchanged. Similarly to the hypothesis concerning the relation between sales and shocks, I also
adjust for the presence of deferred revenue in sales and the results are very similar for the time-
series properties of sales as well (unreported tests).
In general, the hypotheses and the corresponding empirical evidence concerning the
properties of sales/cash sales support the predictions of the real investment framework. The fact
that my findings are robust to alternate specifications of sales that attempt to mimic cash sales,
confirms the real investment story while at the same time makes the findings difficult to
reconcile with an explanation based on asymmetric accounting recognition applications.
Finally, I examine whether financing frictions affect the asymmetric sensitivity of
investment and accounting numbers to shocks. Asymmetric investment sensitivity to negative
shocks should be more pronounced for firms facing financing constraints.4 The logic is that
financing frictions are likely to increase the lag between a positive economic shock and observed
investment outcomes for financially constrained firms. A financially constrained firm may be
also forced to abandon operations and sell assets in order to assure a minimum liquidity
threshold upon suffering a negative shock. If investment and operating activities are distorted by
financing frictions, then accounting numbers should be distorted in a similar manner according to
my theory. Thus, I expect financially constrained firms to exhibit stronger investment sensitivity
to negative shocks and I also predict that sales, earnings and operating cash flow will exhibit a
similar pattern. My results indicate that investment as well as sales, earnings and operating cash
flow sensitivities to negative shocks are significantly stronger for firms facing financing
constraints. This is evidence consistent with the idea that factors affecting real investment and
operating decisions (financing frictions in this case) directly affect the properties of accounting
numbers.
4 There is a long literature examining the effects of financing frictions on investment decisions starting with Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988). I provide a brief review and discussion about how financial constraints affect the
timeliness of investment and the timeliness of accounting numbers in the hypothesis development section of the
paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
the related literature and develops the hypotheses. In section 3, I describe the sample selection
procedure and the research design. I summarize the empirical results and discuss my findings in
section 4. Finally, I conclude in section 5.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
My study attempts to provide an explanation for the documented timeliness properties of
accounting numbers by examining the effects of operating and investment choices on the
properties of accounting numbers. I draw on both the accounting as well as the finance literature
to develop my arguments. In this section of the paper I develop hypotheses related to the
timeliness properties of investment, illustrate and discuss the link between properties of
investment and properties of accounting numbers and develop cross-sectional tests for my
theory.
2.1 Investment sensitivity to economic shocks
2.1.1 Investment sensitivity to current and past shocks
Many studies in the finance and economics literature (for example, Blanchard, Rhee and
Summers, 1993) find a weak negative contemporaneous relation between aggregate investment
and market returns. This result is counter-intuitive since one would expect that when discount
rates fall, both stock prices and investment should rise. Thus, returns and investment should
exhibit a positive contemporaneous correlation. Cochrane (1991) mentions that investment lags
may be responsible for the puzzling observed relation between market returns and aggregate
investment.
Lamont (2000) examines whether investment lags such as planning and construction
requirements can shed light to this puzzle. He examines whether the decision to invest, rather
than the actual capital expenditure, supports the theoretical predictions between investment and
stock returns. Using data on planned aggregate investment from the U.S. Department of
Commerce, he finds that investment plans are positively related to contemporaneous stock
returns. Moreover, planned capital expenditures are negatively related with future stock returns;
a result that is also supported by theory.
Thus, Lamont (2000) demonstrates that the decision to invest is timely, but that actual
investment occurs with a lag relative to the period of the shock. For the purposes of this paper,
the evidence in Lamont (2000) is important because it shows that managerial investment
decisions are timely with respect to changes in economic conditions but the presence of
investment frictions only allow firms to actually modify and optimize their production levels
during periods following a shock to investment opportunities.
Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) analyze investment decisions using a real
options framework. They show that if investments are associated with large sunk costs
(investment irreversibility) and there is uncertainty about the nature of shocks, firms may not
immediately execute investment after a shock. Pindyck (1991) moreover argues that investments
may be executed in a sequential manner where managers wait for uncertainty resolution before
executing the next step of the investment plan. For example, firms operating in the aerospace and
pharmaceutical industries are likely to undertake staged investment and projects in these
industries may require up to 10 years to complete.
Given the evidence on the existence of investment lags due to time-to-build requirements
(Lamont, 2000) and the evidence that firms may delay investment implementation due to
irreversible costs associated with investment, I hypothesize that investment at the firm level will
be weakly associated with current shocks and more strongly associated with past shocks.
Formally stated, my first hypothesis is:
HI: Investment is positively related to current and past shocks.
2.1.2 Asymmetric investment sensitivity to contemporaneous shocks
The analysis thus far (Hypothesis 1) imposes linearity in the relation between investment
and positive versus negative shocks. In other words, investment sensitivity (timeliness) is
assumed to be similar for both positive and negative shocks. However, requirements that need to
be met before investment can be implemented after a positive shock are likely to be different
compared to the requirements needed in the case of divestment decisions after negative shocks.
More specifically, I argue that the decision to divest can be implemented in a more immediate
fashion relative to the investment decision.
The decision to cut investment and downsize operations in response to a negative shock
does not involve the same time consuming pre-investment requirements associated with and
responsible for the lagged investment response to positive shocks. Consider the time lag created
between a positive shock and the resulting investment arising from planning and construction
requirements as well as the need to secure financing for the project. In the case of a divestment
decision, planning is likely to require less time and construction or acquisition of an asset is not a
5 Wurgler (2000) estimates separate investment sensitivities on positive versus negative industry shocks in his cross-
country analysis that examines the effects of institutional variables on investment allocation efficiency. His
motivation and research design are different from this paper. The motivation in Wurgler (2000) is to examine how
country level institutional factors affect the efficiency of capital allocation. My paper does not make claims on
investment efficiency. I hypothesize that asymmetric investment sensitivity to shocks is an outcome of asymmetric
investment adjustment costs.
determinant of the investment lag. Moreover, the presence of financing constraints may delay the
investment process whereas on the other hand speed up the divestment process.6
In general, I expect investment implementation frictions associated with expansions to be
more pronounced relative to divestments and contraction after a negative shock. The discussion
above leads to my second hypothesis:
H2: Investment exhibits a stronger contemporaneous sensitivity
to negative versus positive shocks.
In addition to the stronger investment sensitivity predicted for contemporaneous negative
shocks, there are also reasons suggesting that current investment may exhibit a similar
asymmetric sensitivity to lagged negative shocks as well. As mentioned above, the real options
framework predicts slow investment adjustment to shocks. The real option models emphasize the
irreversible nature of investment and how it may drive managers to delay investment decisions
until uncertainty about the nature of shocks is resolved. The main intuition is that investments are
associated with large sunk (irreversible) costs and firms are likely to delay investment decisions
following shocks in order to obtain more information about the nature of the shock before
executing an irreversible action.
This intuition holds for both investment decisions in response to positive as well as
divestment decisions related to negative shocks. Thus, a symmetric lag may be created between
the period of the shock and the actual investment decision due to the reasons described above.
Even if both investment and divestment decisions follow such a lagged structure, the decision to
6 The inability to secure financing may actually speed up the divestment process by forcing firms to abandon
projects early after a negative shock. I examine this prediction on the effects of financing constraints on investment,
operating decisions and accounting numbers later in the paper.
expand will still exhibit weaker timeliness due to the presence of asymmetric investment
requirements such as planning, time-to-build and financing. This leads me to test whether current
investment and operating activities exhibit relatively stronger sensitivities to lagged negative
shocks.
2.2 Investment dynamics and accounting numbers
2.2.1 Investment and sales
The hypothesized asymmetric investment sensitivity to economic shocks has direct
implications for the timeliness properties of accounting numbers. Sales are a direct outcome of
operating activity which in turn depends on real decisions taken by the firm.7 If the timeliness
properties of revenue are affected by investment and operating decisions, then operating cash
flows and earnings will be affected in a similar manner (given that revenue is a major component
of these accounting numbers).8
In this section, I provide the intuition accompanied by simple algebra to exhibit the
channel through which the timeliness properties of investment influence the timeliness of sales. I
then discuss how accounting numbers, namely earnings and operating cash flows are affected by
real investment and operating decisions through the sales channel. More specifically, I
hypothesize that the delayed investment response to positive shocks will transfer a similar
property to the relation between sales and positive economic shocks and how the timeliness
properties of operating cash flows and earnings will be affected through this channel.
7 Expenses may also be affected by operating and investing decisions. For example, if a firm invests in upgrading
into a relatively less costly technology, expenses and profit margin will be affected. However, for the purposes of
this paper I focus on accounting variables that are less likely to be affected by recognition related issues (revenue).
8 Figure 1 graphically illustrates the channel through which asymmetric investment sensitivity to economic shocks
affects the timeliness properties of revenue, operating cash flows and earnings.
When a firm faces a positive economic shock such as a shock to demand, the firm needs
to invest in order to expand production and meet the new higher level of demand for the product.
Only at the point in time when investment is implemented and production capabilities are
expanded will sales reflect the economic shock. As argued in prior sections of the paper,
investment will lag positive economic shocks due to time-to-build requirements inherent in the
investment process. Moreover, the presence of adjustment costs is likely to induce a further delay
in the investment implementation process. Thus, revenue generation is predicted to lag positive
economic shocks though the investment channel. 9 On the other hand, a firm suffering a negative
shock will experience a relatively timelier drop in revenues. This will be true since capacity is no
longer a determinant of sales timeliness given a negative demand shock. In other words, when
there is a negative shock to demand, the demand side will dictate the new equilibrium quantity in
the market. Again, this will not be the case given a positive shock to demand since supply has to
adjust in order for the market to be in equilibrium.' 0
Next, I use simple algebra to illustrate the link between real investment decisions and
accounting numbers. Consider a firm operating in a two-period world. There is a demand shock
occurring during the first period. Assume IT to be the total investment required by the firm in
order to expand production and meet the new higher level of demand. Denote I, and I2 to be
investment in period t= 1 and t=2 related to the shock in period 1. The magnitude of the economic
shock is represented by R1. Let y be a parameter representing the speed of production adjustment
9 An implicit assumption in this argument is that firms operate close to full capacity. Where firms not facing any
capacity constraints production would quickly adjust to the new level of demand. Since there are costs involved in
creating and maintaining excess capacity, it is reasonable to assume that on average firms will be facing capacity
constraints.
10 It is possible for prices to adjust when there is positive demand shock and quantity supplied cannot meet quantity
demanded. If prices are able to instantly adjust, then profit margins will increase and offset the higher quantity
demanded for the good. The price adjustment will depend on the elasticity of demand. Moreover, prices tend to be
sticky and this implies that given a quantity constraint, the firm will not be able to generate all possible revenue.
in response to the shock. The parameter y increases as time-to-build requirements and adjustment
costs become more significant.
I start by defining investment as a function of the shock. I assume 1y>0O for positive
shocks whereas y=O when the shock is negative."I The presence of the y parameter implies that
production adjustments in response to positive shocks are relatively slower to adjustments in
response to negative shocks.
Thus, investment and operating adjustments for the period are a function of the
magnitude of the shock R1, the presence of an investment lag y and a transformation parameter ic,
where K > 0.
(1 I R, > 0) = (1 - 7)I, = (1 - y)xRI
(I, IR1 < 0) = IT = R 1  (2.1)
Equation 2.1 exhibits the timelier operating response to negative versus positive shocks.
The y parameter is not a determinant (or it is relatively less important) of the timeliness of
operating adjustments to negative shocks. Next, I define the change in sales for the period (AS,)
as a function of investment/operating adjustments and a transformation parameter 4, where ( > 0.
(AS, I R, > 0) = (1 -y) T = (1 -Y)dRl
(AS, IR, < 0) = ',T = 6cR, (2.2)
Since 0 < < < 1, equation 2.2 states that the innovation in sales during a period of a
positive demand shock will be smaller relative to the sales response during a period of a negative
demand shock. Timeliness of sales given a positive demand shock in equation 2.2 is affected by
the slow investment response to positive shocks. Formally stated, my third hypothesis is:
" Another way to view parameter y being equal to zero when the shock is negative is by observing that after a
negative demand shock the firm just downsizes production. Divestment is not necessary for the firm to experience
an immediate drop in sales, cash flows and earnings after a negative shock.
H3: Sales exhibit a stronger contemporaneous sensitivity to
negative versus positive shocks.
The discussion above concentrates on the relation between sales and economic news. The
investment model however also generates predictions about the time-series properties of sales
numbers. The predictions on the time-series properties of sales under the investment model could
potentially help establish the existence of a real effect as a determinant of accounting numbers in
addition to recognition related effects. To be more specific, the investment model predicts
persistence of sales growth across periods when the economic shock is positive whereas negative
shocks will tend to be reflected in sales in a more immediate and complete fashion (no
persistence of negative sales changes is predicted over subsequent periods).
Continuing the algebraic illustration, let's examine investment and sales responses in the
second period of the model. The following relation illustrates investment in the second period of
the model conditioning on the sign of the shock in the first period.
(I2 1 R, > 0) = IT = dR, > 0
(I2 IR, < 0) = 0 (2.3)
When the shock to demand is positive in the first period (RI>0), there will be operating
adjustments and/or investment in the second period triggered by the shock during the first period.
On the other hand, when the first period shock is negative, there are no operating adjustments in
the second period. Sales activity during the second period will be a function of operating
adjustments in response to the first period shock:
(AS2 I R, > 0)= 7, = ySKR, > 0
(AS2 R, < 0) = 0 (2.4)
The slow operating adjustments to positive shocks thus imply that sales activity will also
lag positive economic shocks. On the contrary, sales will mostly reflect a negative economic
shock during the period of the shock (t=l) and there will be no/little change in sales activity in
the following period (t=2).
The analysis above implies a predictable pattern for the time-series properties of sales.
Sales partially reflect the positive demand shock in period 1 due to slow operating adjustments.
These adjustments continue in period 2 and sales fully reflect the new higher level of demand.
This means that the positive sales shock will spread out over the two periods. When the demand
shock in period 1 is negative, sales more completely (and timely) reflect the negative shock
during the period and there is no sales activity in period 2 related to the negative shock in period
1. Formally, I expect the following time-series properties of sales numbers:
corr(AS,,AS2) > 0, for AS1>0
corr(AS1,,AS2 ) = 0, for AS,<0 (2.5)
So, a positive serial correlation in sales innovations is predicted given a positive sales
shock during period 1 whereas no serial correlation is expected for sales innovations when the
sales shock in period 1 is negative. 12 The discussion above leads to my fourth hypothesis:
H4: Positive sales innovations are more likely to persist over subsequent periods
than negative sales innovations.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 involve predictions on the properties of sales that are derived from
the real investment framework developed earlier in the paper. It is useful at this point to discuss
whether these predictions are unique to the investment model or whether they may also be
supported by accounting conservatism.
Starting with hypothesis 3, the investment model predicts that negative shocks will be
more quickly reflected in sales rather than positive shocks due to investment lags. Accounting
conservatism predicts that given a negative shock, firms will capitalize expected operating losses
into current period earnings whereas if the shock is positive, firms will wait until the good news
is realized in order to record the appropriate accounting transaction. As a consequence, most of
the action according to the conservatism explanation for asymmetric timeliness in earnings
would tend to concentrate on the expense part of the income statement. Sales are a top line item
in the income statement and are not likely to be affected by items such as write-offs that may be
generated from accounting conservatism and concentrate on the expense side of the income
statement. Thus, examining the relation of sales with respect to economic news provides an
interesting setting to isolate a real operating effect on accounting numbers.
12 Figure 2 graphically illustrates the sales path given an initial positive or negative shock.
There is however some recognition involved in the revenue number as reported by
COMPUSTAT; namely accounts receivable and deferred revenue are included in the reported
sales number. One may claim that it is the recognition involved in these accounts that drives the
properties of sales with respect to economic news. I attempt to control for the recognition effect
in sales by adjusting the net sales number for accounts receivable in tests of hypothesis 3 (and in
tests of hypothesis 4). Whereas information on accounts receivable is available throughout my
sample period (1970-2000), COMPUSTAT only provides information on deferred revenue
starting in 2000. In unreported tests, I estimate the model in hypothesis 3 by adjusting for the
presence of both accounts receivable as well as deferred revenue in the sales variable using a
sample that spans the 2001-2006 period. Adjusting for accounts receivable and deferred revenue
should provide a measure of sales that is mostly based on current year cash transactions. This
adjusted sales number is likely to capture real effects and provide more robust evidence on the
validity of the investment model as an explanation for the observed properties of accounting
numbers.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that positive shocks will affect sales and cash sales over multiple
periods due to the presence of investment lags whereas negative shocks will affect sales and cash
sales in a timelier and more complete manner. This hypothesis can help distinguish between the
real investment effects on asymmetric timeliness versus the effects of accounting conservatism.
Basu (1997) predicts and finds evidence that under accounting conservatism, negative earnings
changes tend to reverse whereas positive earnings changes persist. The logic behind the
hypothesis in Basu (1997) about the time-series properties of earnings under accounting
conservatism is as follows. Given a negative shock, accountants will tend to capitalize expected
operating losses into current earnings and thus earnings will suffer a big shock in the current
period. Since expected operating losses are capitalized into current earnings, future earnings will
be shielded from the negative shock in the current period. The implication is that next period's
earnings will recover to a higher level (the level before the negative shock) and one would
observe a reversal.
With respect to the time-series properties of sales/cash sales, hypothesis 4 predicts
persistence of positive sales/cash sales changes due to the investment lag whereas negative
sales/cash sales changes would tend to occur in a more permanent and complete fashion during
the period of the shock. Unlike the prediction in Basu (1997) regarding the reversal of earnings
given a negative earnings shock, the prediction on the time-series properties of sales under the
investment framework is that sales will suffer the negative shock timely but without a reversal.
In other words, there is no capitalization of expected deteriorating performance in the sales/cash
sales variable and the more complete and timely response of sales/cash sales given the negative
shock occurs due to the absence of the investment lag. The prediction in hypothesis 4 is not
likely to be consistent with an explanation supported by accounting conservatism because sales
are not likely to contain non-recurring items such as write-offs that would attribute a reversal
property to negative sales changes. Moreover, the support for the investment model would be
strengthened if the results hold after removing accounts receivable and deferred revenue from the
sales number.
2.2.2 Investment, sales and accounting numbers
There is a large literature in accounting examining the timeliness properties of accounting
numbers. For example, Kothari and Sloan (1992) show that stock prices contain information
about future earnings. Collins, Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1994) distinguish between an
'earnings lack of timeliness' versus a 'noise in earnings' explanation for the low
contemporaneous relation between earnings and stock returns. Collins et al (1994) find evidence
supporting the lack of timeliness hypothesis and reject the noise in earnings hypothesis as an
explanation for the low contemporaneous relation between earnings and stock returns.
Dechow (1994) and Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998) formally model the relation
between cash flows and accruals and show how accruals ameliorate matching and timing
problems that are present in a cash accounting system. The point of origin in the analysis of both
papers is a shock to sales; accruals are then modeled as a function of sales innovations.
In this paper, I focus on the timeliness properties of accounting numbers from a real
investment perspective. Thus, I take a step back and examine the relation between economic
shocks and how the speed of investment responses to such shocks affects the timeliness
properties of sales, operating cash flows and earnings. As stated in my third hypothesis, if one
takes into account that investment is necessary for a firm to increase its production and thus its
revenue, the sales shock need not necessarily coincide with the period of the economic shock
(the period that stock prices reflect the shock). I continue my analysis by providing the intuition
as to why accruals may not be able to fully ameliorate the lack of earnings timeliness created by
the slow adjustment of investment to positive shocks.
Earnings for the period (Xi) are defined as a function of profit margin nt and revenue S1.
Assuming that changes in profit margin are not asymmetric conditional on the sign of shocks,
there is an asymmetry in earnings reflecting shocks created by the inability of sales to
immediately reflect to positive shocks. Sales more quickly reflect negative news because
investment is not an intermediate step in the process. Moreover, when the shock is negative,
conservative recognition practices will accelerate the recognition of bad news into earnings
(capitalization of future expected operating losses). The earnings response to positive and
negative news is defined in equation (6) below:{(AXI R, > 0) = ,rAS, = rgS(l - y)I, = rSK(1 - y)R,
(AX, I R, < 0) = IAS, = rI, + pRl = SKR + pR (2.6)
Equation 2.6 shows how the delayed adjustment of production will be a determinant of
the timeliness properties of earnings. Since investment is only necessary to achieve higher
production levels, earnings timeliness will not be affected by investment lags when news is
negative. Moreover, the earnings response to negative shocks will be amplified by asymmetric
recognition related effects due to accounting conservatism (parameter qp) and will be proportional
to the magnitude of negative news.
The investment based framework provides a potential explanation for the asymmetric
operating cash flow sensitivity to negative versus positive news first documented in Basu (1997).
Operating cash flows are likely to be determined by real effects. If the determinants of operating
cash flows, namely investing and operating activities, exhibit slow adjustment to positive shocks,
then the outcomes of these activities will also exhibit similar properties.
In addition to the asymmetric timeliness of operating cash flows arising from the slow
adjustment of production to positive news shocks, I argue that since the shock to sales is timelier
when news is negative, adjustments in working capital will in turn be timelier as well. In the
model of Dechow, Kothari and Watts (1998), working capital accruals are either functions of
current sales or estimates of next period's sales. Since the shock to sales is relatively less timely
when news is positive, the corresponding accrual adjustments (being a function of sales shocks)
will also exhibit lack of timeliness for positive economic shocks.
When news is negative, a more immediate sales reaction is expected absent the
capacity/supply constraint. This implies a timelier drop in working capital requirements as well.
With regards to the timing between the economic shock and working capital adjustments,
working capital accrual adjustments are more likely to occur during the period of the economic
shock. The current drop in sales will affect the levels of working capital during the period that
the shock is reflected in stock returns. The stronger timeliness of accruals to negative news
resulting from the stronger timeliness of sales to negative news will be distinct from the
asymmetric recognition effect described in Basu (1997). The difference is that the accrual effect
described in Basu (1997) refers to conservative practices recognizing future expected negative
operating effects on earnings whereas timelier working capital accruals when news is negative
are predicted from the investment model even in the absence of asymmetric recognition related
practices.
Summarizing the discussion above linking the real investment framework to documented
properties of accounting numbers, I argue that i. Asymmetric operating cash flow timeliness is
expected since production adjusts to positive shocks with a lag, ii. Working capital accruals will
be timelier in reflecting negative economic news due to the timelier shock to sales and iii.
Accruals related to asymmetric recognition related effects due to accounting conservatism will
further reinforce the timeliness of earnings to negative news. The real investment effect and the
asymmetric recognition effect are likely to be positively correlated. Combined, the two forces
will create an earnings measure of performance that is timelier in reflecting negative economic
shocks.
2.3 Financing constraints
In this section I examine whether an essential requirement for quick investment
implementation, namely financing ability, has implications for the timeliness properties of
accounting numbers. There is a large literature starting with Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988) providing evidence on how financing frictions affect corporate investment decisions. The
main finding of this literature is that investment exhibits a positive sensitivity to cash flows even
after controlling for investment opportunities. This investment-cash flow sensitivity is more
pronounced for firms classified as financially constrained. Based on the evidence that financing
constraints affect investment decisions, I expect that financing constraints will be a determinant
of the investment lag between shocks and investment activities.' 3
Financial constraints also have implications for the timing of project abandonment and
divestment. A financially constrained firm will be more likely to be forced to cut investments
and even sell assets when it suffers a negative shock. The negative shock will impact current
cash flow and signal lower future cash flows. For firms that are likely to be financially
constrained, internally generated cash flows may not be adequate to ensure a minimum liquidity
threshold. Thus, outside financiers will be reluctant to extend credit to such a firm or require a
high return as compensation for the higher probability of default. Supplier financing may be
affected in a similar manner. Suppliers may be less willing to extend credit to the firm if there is
a fear that payments may default. On the contrary, firms with adequate cash flow generation or
cash reserves will be less likely to face similar issues. Even if the firm suffers a negative shock
and cash flow expectations are lowered, the firm is more likely to have enough cash flow or cash
13 Note however that there are other important determinants of investment lags such as planning and time-to-build
requirements.
reserves to meet credit obligations and avoid distortions in its investment and operating
activities.
Summarizing, I expect firms that are likely to be financially unconstrained to be able to
more quickly implement investments after positive shocks whereas financially constrained firms
may be forced to quickly abandon operations following a negative shock. Since sales, operating
cash flows and earnings are outcomes of investment and operating activities, a similar prediction
holds for the timeliness properties of these variables. The discussion above leads to my fifth
hypothesis:
H5a: Investment exhibits more pronounced asymmetric timeliness for financially
constrained firms.
H5b: Sales, operating cash flows and earnings exhibit more pronounced asymmetric
timeliness for financially constrained firms.
3. Sample selection and research design
My sample covers the 1970-2000 period. I start by identifying all non-utility and non-
financial firms on the Compustat database with non-missing values of earnings before
extraordinary items (datal8), capital expenditures (datal28), gross PP&E (data7), employees
(data29), sales (datal2) as well as variables required to calculate accruals and Tobin's Q. Since
my research design requires the construction of annual growth rates in capital expenditures,
PP&E, employment, sales and earnings, two consecutive years of available data for these
variables are required for a firm to be included in my sample. The independent variables in my
regressions include contemporaneous as well as lagged stock returns and data required to
calculate Tobin's Q. Some of my tests require the calculation of three years of lagged stock
returns as explanatory variables; I require firms to have four years of data available on CRSP in
order to calculate the returns measures. I then merge the COMPUSTAT and CRSP data and
winsorise the top and bottom percentile of each variable in order to avoid the effect of outliers.
The final sample consists of 71,978 firm/year observations. 14
My first hypothesis examines investment and operating activities as functions of current
and lagged shocks. More specifically, I predict that investment exhibits a low association with
current shocks and a stronger association with lagged shocks. In the absence of a clear theoretical
prediction and based on anecdotal evidence on significant cross-industry variation in investment
lags, I examine investment as a function of current, one and two period lagged shocks.
I employ the following model to test hypothesis 1:
I, = a+ ,R, +l2R,_, + f 3R,_2 + 6 (3.1)
A variety of investment and operating activity measures are used as dependent variables
in model 3.1. The variable It takes one of the following definitions: Level of capital expenditures,
capital expenditure growth, growth in Property, Plant and Equipment and employee growth. The
independent variables are the contemporaneous annual stock return (Rt), one-period lagged (Rt- 1)
and two-period lagged stock return (Rt-2) and are used as proxies for economic shocks occurring
in the corresponding periods. Returns are calculated starting eight months before and ending four
14 Requiring firms to have four years of data on CRSP in order to be included in the sample may induce a
survivorship bias that may affect the results. As a robustness check, I re-estimate the empirical specifications
involving contemporaneous associations using a sample filter that requires firms to exist in COMPUSTAT and
CRSP for two consecutive years. The results are similar for the less restrictive sample.
months after the fiscal year-end. 15 I expect all coefficients to be positive and I also expect
investment to be more strongly related to past shocks ((l2, 33) > 81).
Hypothesis 2 examines whether there exists a differential speed of investment adjustment
to negative versus positive shocks. I expect investment and operating decisions in response to
bad news shocks to be carried out in a timelier manner due to lower investment adjustment costs
such as time-to-build and financing requirements. I employ a piece-wise linear regression
specification to test hypothesis 2. Contemporaneous annual stock returns are used as a proxy for
shocks. In order to test for a differential sensitivity of investment and operating activities to bad
versus good news shocks, I estimate the following model:
I t = a, + oDt + fR, + o2Dt *Rt + Q,1  + e (3.2)
The dependent variable, It is defined as in hypothesis 1 above. Rt is the annual stock
return calculated starting eight months before and ending four months after the fiscal year-end.
Dt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if Rt<O and zero otherwise. The interaction term Dt*Rt in
model 3.2 measures the incremental sensitivity of investment and operating activities to negative
contemporaneous shocks. I include the lagged value of Tobin's Q (Qt-,) as an additional variable
in model 3.2 to control for effects of lagged shocks on current investment. I expect a stronger
sensitivity of investment to negative shocks (f#2>0).
15 1 also estimate the models using fiscal-year returns as a robustness check. Results are similar to the ones reported
in the tables.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that sales (cash sales) and sales changes (cash sales changes) will
be timelier when news is negative. I test my third hypothesis using the following piece-wise
linear specification:
(SalesActivity,) = a + o0 (D,)+ f,(R,)+ I 2(D, * R,)+ E (3.3)
The dependent variable in model 3.3 is either sales levels (cash sales levels) or sales changes
(cash sales changes). Dr, Rt and Dt*Rt are defined in a similar manner to equation 3.2. The
coefficient on Rt represents the sensitivity of sales/changes in sales to positive stock returns
whereas the coefficient on Rt*Dt represents the incremental sensitivity of sales/changes in sales
to stock returns when returns are negative. I expect sales to exhibit a stronger sensitivity to news
when news is negative {(62+fl)> fl }.
Hypothesis 4 examines the time-series properties of sales numbers. Positive sales
innovations are predicted to only partially reflect the economic shock due to investment lags.
Thus, future sales numbers are expected to completely reflect the economic shock when
operating adjustments are implemented. This implies a positive autocorrelation of sales numbers
given a positive economic shock. On the other hand, a negative shock is more likely to be
quickly reflected in sales given the absence of a supply side constraint. Thus, negative economic
shocks are expected to be quickly and more completely reflected in sales during the period of the
shock. This implies a permanent drop in sales levels and no correlation with future sales changes.
These predictions are tested using the following model:
(ASalest) = al + , (Dr_1) + ,(ASales,_ ) + , 2(D_, * ASales,_ ) + e (3.4)
The dependent variable in model 3.4 is sales changes (cash sales changes), Dr.1 is an indicator
variable equal to one if sales changes in period t-l are negative and zero otherwise. ASalestl is
sales changes during period t-1. The coefficient P1 captures the association of past sales changes
with current sales changes when past sales changes are positive whereas the coefficient (Pi + 12)
captures the association of current with past sales changes when past sales changes are negative.
I expect fi>0 and fll+fl2=0.
Hypothesis 5a predicts a more pronounced asymmetry in the sensitivity of investment to
bad news shocks versus good news shocks for financially constrained firms. In order to test this
hypothesis, I employ measures of financing constraints and categorize firms into financially
constrained and financially unconstrained. Following Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004),
I use the firm's payout ratio and debt ratings as proxies for financing constraints.
The payout ratio is calculated as the sum of dividends and stock repurchases deflated by
total assets. Firms are then annually ranked based on their payout ratio. Firms in the top three
deciles of the ranking procedure are considered financially unconstrained whereas firms residing
in the bottom three deciles of the ranking procedure are considered financially constrained. The
debt rating proxy for financial constraints is constructed as follows: all firms with outstanding
long-term debt and an existing credit rating are categorized as financially unconstrained whereas
firms with outstanding long-term debt and no credit rating are categorized as financially
constrained. Model 3.2 described above is estimated separately for financially constrained and
financially unconstrained firms.
(I, I Fin.Uncon) = ai, + 8o,u (D,) + Il,u (R,) + f2,u (D, * R,) + ru (Q,1_) + E
(I, I Fin.Con) = a,c + ,o,c (D,) + f,c (R,) +2,c ,(D, * R, ) + c (Qt-,) + 6 (3.5)
All variables are defined in a similar manner to model 3.2. I expect investment and
operating activities to be relatively more responsive to contemporaneous good news shocks for
financially unconstrained firms (fll,u > Il,c) whereas I expect investment and operating activities
to be relatively more responsive to bad news shocks for financially constrained firms (f2,c >
fl2,U). Since I am interested in isolating the effect of current shocks on investment, I include Qt.I
as an additional explanatory variable to control for the effect of past shocks on current
investment.
Hypothesis 5b is tested by estimating and comparing the coefficients from Basu (1997)
type regressions (using sales, earnings and operating cash flows as dependent variables) for
financially constrained and financially unconstrained firms.
(Accounting, I Fin.Uncon) = at,u + lo,u (D,) + P,u (R,) + 82,u (D, * R,) +
(Accounting, IFin.Con) = ai,c + /o,c (D,) + A,c (Rt) + fl2 ,c (D , * R,) +6 (3.6)
In equation 3.6, I expect sales, earnings and operating cash flows to be relatively more
sensitive to good news shocks for financially unconstrained firms (fll,u > fij,c). On the other
hand, I expect sales, earnings and operating cash flows to be more sensitive to bad news shocks
for financially constrained firms (#2,c > &u2,U) since these firms are more likely to encounter
distortions in their operating activities due to the financing constraints and eventually be forced
to quickly abandon projects.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in subsequent tests. All
variables are deflated by average total assets except the employee growth variable (AEmpt)
which is deflated by the lagged number of employees. Starting with the Capext variable, firms
spend on average 7.6% of existing asset value on capital expenditures. Change in gross PP&E
(APP&E) is lower at 5.5% of average asset value. The difference is probably due to the fact that
Capext does not capture actual divestment. Firms on average increase their employee base by
6.7%. Salest and CashSalest are essentially identical due to the fact that on average accounting
discretion in the Salest variable will cancel out over time. The average annual stock return for the
sample is 17% and Tobin's Q has an average value of 1.6.
Table 2 presents Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal)
correlations between the variables. Focusing on the contemporaneous correlations between
investment and stock returns, it is clear that investment exhibits a very low correlation with stock
returns. The highest correlation between an investment measure and stock returns is the
correlation between employee growth and stock returns (0.11 Pearson). Capital expenditures
exhibit insignificant correlations with contemporaneous stock returns. This is preliminary
evidence supporting the hypothesis that investment does not immediately respond to shocks.
Looking at the correlations among various investment measures and sales shocks, the
correlations are stronger. Capital expenditures and capital expenditure growth exhibit
correlations of 0.14 and 0.2 with sales shocks. The correlation between APP&E, and ASalest is
0.32 and the correlation between AEmpt and ASalest is the strongest among all investment
measures at 0.44. Notice that sales shocks are strongly correlated with APP&E and AEmpt. This
is probably due to the fact that the two investment variables reflect both investment as well as
divestment (relative to capital expenditures that only reflect positive investment). ASalest is
strongly correlated with ACashSalest. Lagged Q is positively related to all investment measures.
The strongest correlation is between lagged Q and employment growth with a correlation
coefficient of 0.2 (0.26 Spearman).
4.2 Results for hypothesis 1
Table 3 presents the results from OLS regressions of various investment measures on
contemporaneous and lagged stock returns.' 6 As predicted in hypothesis 1, investment is related
to current as well as past shocks. The coefficients on contemporaneous stock returns are
statistically significant for all measures of investment examined. This is evidence that there is
some immediate reaction of investment to shocks.
Examining the impact of lagged shocks on current investment activities reveals that
current investment exhibits a much stronger sensitivity to lagged shocks. The coefficient
magnitudes on R,.1 are multiples of the coefficient magnitudes on R, and are all statistically
significant at the 1% level. For instance, the fourth column of table 3 shows the results from
regressions of APP&Et on current and lagged stock returns. The coefficient on Rt is 0.009
whereas the coefficients on Rt-_ and Rt-2 are 0.027 and 0.029 respectively. Thus, changes in
current PP&E are three times more sensitive to shocks occurring two and three periods in the
past relative to the contemporaneous sensitivity of APP&E with stock returns. Similar results
hold across all columns in table 3 for the various investment measures employed. This is strong
evidence supporting hypothesis 1; current investment and operating activity reflects decisions in
response to economic shocks occurring up to three periods in the past.
For the purposes of this paper, the results on hypothesis 1 are important because they
reveal the delayed response of real operating activities to economic shocks. This finding supports
16 Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are Huber-White adjusted and
clustered at the firm level.
the view that in a world without recognition effects in accounting numbers, accounting numbers
would still lack timeliness due to delayed responses of real determinants of accounting numbers,
namely investment and operating activities.
4.3 Results for hypothesis 2
Table 3 provides strong evidence supporting hypothesis 1 by exhibiting the delayed
investment response to shocks. An underlying assumption in hypothesis 1 and the interpretation
of the corresponding results in table 3 is that investment sensitivities are symmetric to positive
and negative shocks. Hypothesis 2 expands on hypothesis 1 and states that investment responses
to negative shocks are expected to be implemented in a more immediate fashion due to relatively
lower investment frictions.
Table 4 presents results for hypothesis 2. I separately estimate investment sensitivities to
contemporaneous positive and negative news. Starting with the sensitivity of investment to
positive stock returns, there does not seem to be a consistent relation between investment and
positive shocks across the various investment measures used. Two investment measures, Capext
and APP&Et have statistically insignificant associations with positive stock returns whereas
ACapext and AEmpt are positively and significantly related to positive shocks. This result
confirms the idea that fixed investment responds to positive shocks with a lag. Labor, being a
variable input of production, seems to adjust in a relatively timelier fashion relative to
adjustments in fixed capital.
Examining the sensitivity of investment to negative shocks reveals a more consistent
pattern across all columns of table 4. All investment measures examined exhibit a strong
contemporaneous sensitivity with shocks when shocks are negative. It is difficult to compare the
relative magnitudes of the investment sensitivity differences to positive versus negative stock
returns since investment sensitivities to positive returns are minimal. The incremental
coefficients on negative stock returns are all positive and statistically significant. Take column 1
for example where the dependent variable is Capext. The coefficient on positive stock returns is
0 whereas the incremental coefficient on negative stock returns is 0.0126. In order to better
compare the differences in investment sensitivities to positive versus negative news, I expand the
window of returns measurement to two periods (Rt, Rtl).
Panel B of table 4 presents results from regressions of current investment on two year
cumulated returns (Rt, Rt_1). A reason behind using current as well as lagged stock returns to
explain current investment is potential mismeasurement and mismatching between the period of
the shock and the investment action. For example, if the shock occurs towards the end of the
period, stock returns will reflect the shock during that period. On the other hand, investment or
divestment may be impossible to be implemented between the date of the shock and the end of
the period. Including past returns will partly resolve this mismatching issue.
Examining panel B of table 4 reveals the asymmetric sensitivity of investment to negative
shocks occurring during the two year interval between period t-1 and t. The coefficients on
positive shocks are all positive and statistically significant in contrast to the inconsistent pattern
in panel A of table 4. The incremental sensitivity of investment to negative shocks is clearly
evident as well. Moreover, the coefficients for investment sensitivity to positive shocks have
more plausible values relative to the coefficients in table 3 and allow me to create measures of
relative asymmetric sensitivity for the variables.
Panel C of table 4 presents the ratios of asymmetric investment sensitivity to negative
versus positive stock returns. The strongest asymmetry is evident in the APP&Et (Capext)
measures where the change in gross PP&E is 11 times (8 times) more sensitive to negative stock
returns. Capital expenditure growth is six times more sensitive to bad news shocks than to good
news shocks. The sensitivity of employment to bad news shocks is four times stronger relative to
the sensitivity of employment to good news shocks. Overall, the evidence in table 4 suggests that
firms are able (or forced) to react to negative shocks in a timelier manner relative to positive
shocks.
Panel A of table 5 presents results from piece-wise linear regressions of operating and
investing variables on current and lagged returns. The tests in table 5 show that investment and
operating activities are associated with shocks occurring up to four periods in the past. Moreover,
the asymmetric sensitivity of investment to negative shocks seems to exist for past returns as
well. This finding is consistent with the presence of asymmetric investment lags and with
managers delaying irreversible investment and divestment decisions until more information
about the nature of the shock is revealed (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Panel B of table 5 shows the
declining pattern of asymmetric investment sensitivities to negative shocks for lagged returns.
The asymmetry in the sensitivity of investment to negative lagged shocks is 35% to 85% lower
compared to the asymmetric sensitivity of investment to contemporaneous negative shocks.
4.4 Results for hypothesis 3
Table 6 presents the results from tests of hypothesis 3. The prediction in hypothesis 3
states that sales will be more sensitive to negative shocks since investment is only a determinant
of production adjustment to positive shocks. I present results regarding the timeliness of net sales
and net sales adjusted for accounts receivable. In unreported tests, I adjust the net sales number
for both accounts receivable and deferred revenue (sample period 2001-2006) and the results are
very similar with the ones reported in table 6 so I only report the results for net sales and net
sales adjusted for accounts receivable.
Panel A of table 6 presents the results from piece-wise linear regressions of sales and
cash sales on good and bad news shocks. Both sales and cash sales exhibit positive and
statistically significant sensitivity to good news. The coefficient on positive stock returns is
0.026 (0.016) for sales (cash sales). The significant immediate response of sales to positive news
is probably due to the fact that some unused capacity exists allowing firms some flexibility in
their operating responses to positive shocks. As predicted in hypothesis 3 however, sales and
cash sales exhibit significant incremental sensitivity to negative news. The incremental
coefficient on negative stock returns for the sales (cash sales) regression is 0.24 (0.21).
Panel B of table 6 exhibits the sensitivity of sales and cash sales changes to negative
versus positive shocks. For either sales measure used, the asymmetric timeliness of sales levels
documented in panel A of table 6 is robust to a 'changes' specification. Sales changes (cash sales
changes) are more sensitive to negative news with an incremental coefficient on negative shocks
of 0.11 (0.1). Panel C of table 6 summarizes the findings in panel A and panel B of table 6 by
comparing the sensitivity of all sales activity measures examined to negative and positive news.
Sales and cash sales are 10 and 14 times more sensitive to negative shocks than positive shocks
and changes in sales and cash sales are both more than three times as sensitive to negative than
positive shocks.
Overall, the results in table 6 strongly support hypothesis 3. Moreover, the results in table
6 provide evidence that an accounting number whose timeliness properties are less likely to be
an outcome of asymmetric accounting recognition applications exhibits strong asymmetric
timeliness. The fact that I find strong asymmetric timeliness in cash sales lends support to the
overall idea in the paper that there exists a real effect stemming from investment dynamics that
influences the properties of accounting numbers. These results confirm my prediction that sales
and cash sales, being a direct outcome of investment and operating activities, are directly
affected by the timeliness properties of investment.
4.5 Results for hypothesis 4
Table 7 present results for hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 4 predicts that positive shocks are
likely to impact sales over time due to the investment lag whereas negative shocks are likely to
impact sales in a more timely fashion and manifest themselves as permanent changes during the
period of the shock. The intuition behind hypothesis 4 is that since operations require time to
adjust to positive shocks, the firm can only fully respond to a positive shock over time so sales
will be spread out over subsequent periods. On the other hand, when the firm suffers a negative
shock there will be a more immediate and permanent drop in demand and as a consequence sales
will reflect the negative shock in a more immediate and complete fashion. Panel A (panel B) of
table 7 presents results on the time-series properties of ASales (ACashSales) and panel C of table
7 replicates the Basu (1997) result on the time-series properties of earnings in order to provide
for a comparison and better illustration of the real operating versus the recognition related effect
on accounting numbers. In panel D of table 7, I compare the findings on the time-series
properties of sales versus earnings.
Starting with panel A of table 7, sales changes appear to be positively correlated over
subsequent periods with a statistically significant coefficient of 0.27. When the autocorrelation
structure in sales changes is allowed to vary conditional on the sign of prior period sales changes,
a different picture emerges. When prior period sales changes are positive, current period sales
changes are likely to be positive with a coefficient of 0.36. On the other hand, when prior period
sales changes are negative, there is very low predictability about current sales changes. This is
true since the incremental coefficient (Dt*ASalest) is -0.3 and statistically significant. Thus, the
autocorrelation coefficient on negative sales changes is relatively small (0.06) although
statistically significant.
Panel B of table 7 examines the autocorrelation structure of changes in cash sales.'7 The
change in cash sales variable (ACashSalest) is adjusted for the influence of accounts receivable
on the sales number and should provide more support on the idea that the time-series properties
of sales changes, reported in panel A of table 7, are likely to stem from a real operating effect.
The results in panel B are similar to the results reported in panel A of table 7. Positive cash sales
changes appear to persist with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.24. On the other hand, negative
cash sales changes are less likely to persist since the incremental coefficient when last period
cash sales changes are negative is -0.16.
Panel C of table 7 replicates the Basu (1997) result on the time-series properties of
earnings changes. Confirming Basu's results, earnings changes are negatively auto-correlated
over subsequent periods but the main effect is concentrated in cases when last period earnings
changes are negative. This reversal property of negative earnings changes is an effect of
accounting conservatism.
Panel D of table 7 compares the time-series structure of sales changes, cash sales changes
and earnings changes. It is clear that sales changes and earnings changes exhibit different
behavior in terms of their time-series properties. Earnings changes are on average negatively
autocorrelated (mainly when last period earnings changes are negative) whereas sales changes
17 The results in panel B of table 7 refer to net sales adjusted for accounts receivable. As in tests for hypothesis 3, I
also estimate the model using a sales number adjusted for both accounts receivable and deferred revenue in
unreported tests. The results are similar to the ones presented in panel B of table 7.
and cash sales changes are on average positively autocorrelated. Analyzing the time-series
properties upon conditioning on the sign of last period's change in these variables, earnings
changes tend to reverse when last period earnings change is negative whereas sales changes
appear to exhibit a permanent drop during the period (no reversal whatsoever). When last
period's change in the dependent variable is positive, sales changes tend to be positive during the
current period whereas earnings changes show a very mild reversal. Overall, the evidence in
table 7 provides support for the notion that there is a real determinant affecting the properties of
accounting numbers. The documented behavior on the time-series properties of sales changes
and cash sales changes is consistent with the investment story proposed in this paper but difficult
to reconcile with an accounting conservatism explanation.
4.6 Results for hypothesis 5
I present results regarding hypotheses 5a and 5b in tables 8 and 9. Hypothesis 5a predicts
that the asymmetric sensitivity of firms' investment and operating responses to negative versus
positive shocks will be more pronounced for financially constrained firms. According to my
theory, an immediate implication is that outcomes of investment and operating activity such as
sales, earnings and operating cash flows should exhibit similar predictable patterns of
asymmetric timeliness as well (Hypothesis 5b).
Table 8 presents investment sensitivities to positive versus negative shocks for financially
constrained and financially unconstrained firms using two financial constraint proxies (payout
ratio and debt ratings). There is a consistent pattern across all investment measures examined
when partitioning firms based on their payout ratio. Financially constrained firms exhibit
consistent asymmetric timeliness across all investment measures examined. For example, the
coefficient on positive stock returns for AEmpt is 0.035 whereas the incremental coefficient on
negative stock returns (Dt*Rt) is 0.17. This shows that for financially constrained firms,
employee growth is six times more sensitive to news when news is negative
((0.035+0.17)/0.035). On the other hand, employee growth is not more sensitive to negative
shocks for financially unconstrained firms (coefficient of -0.02 with t-statistic of -1.1). The
differences in the sensitivities of all investment measures to positive versus negative shocks for
financially constrained and unconstrained firms are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
When firms are identified as financially constrained using the debt rating proxy, the
results are similar. Employee growth for example shows a much stronger sensitivity to negative
shocks for financially constrained firms. More specifically, the sensitivity of employment growth
to positive returns is 0.042 whereas the incremental coefficient on negative stock returns is 0.13.
This means that employee growth is more than four times ((0.042+0.13) / 0.042) as sensitive to
shocks when shocks are negative. On the other hand, there is no incremental sensitivity of
employment growth to negative shocks for financially unconstrained firms. The differences in
the incremental sensitivity of investment to negative shocks for financially constrained firms are
all stronger and statistically different from the corresponding sensitivities of investment to
negative shocks for financially unconstrained firms. Financially unconstrained firms however do
not appear to be more sensitive to positive shocks relative to financially constrained firms using
the debt rating proxy for financial constraints.
Table 9 presents the results from tests of hypothesis 5b. Basu (1997) type regressions
using sales, cash sales, earnings and operating cash flows as dependent variables for financially
constrained and unconstrained firms are estimated. Staring with the sales/sales changes
specification (Panel A) for the sample of financially constrained firms, it is clear that sales
exhibit a much stronger sensitivity to negative shocks. For example, when the dependent variable
is sales, the coefficient on positive stock returns is 0.016 whereas the coefficient on negative
stock returns is 0.26 for payout constrained firms. There is no incremental sensitivity of sales to
negative shocks for financially unconstrained firms for either financial constraint proxy
employed. A similar pattern exists when the dependent variable is sales growth for both financial
constraints partition examined. The differences in the sensitivities of sales and sales changes to
negative shocks for financially constrained and unconstrained firms are all stronger and
statistically significant at the 1% level (a statistically stronger sensitivity of sales/sales changes to
positive shocks for financially unconstrained firms is observed in the payout partition only).
Panel A of table 9 also presents results from piece-wise linear regressions of cash sales
and cash sales changes on positive and negative shocks for financially constrained and
unconstrained firms. The results are identical to the results reported in panel A of table 9 and
show that even after adjusting the sales number for recognition effects found in accounts
receivable, the picture is essentially the same proving that investment dynamics are a real
determinant of the timeliness properties of sales.
Panel B of table 9 presents results of earnings and operating cash flow regressions on
positive and negative stock returns for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Starting
with the earnings regression for the sample of payout (debt) constrained firms, the coefficient on
positive stock returns is 0.001 (-0.01) whereas the incremental coefficient on negative stock
returns is 0.27 (0.33). The respective coefficients for financially unconstrained firms are 0.014
(0) for positive stock returns with the incremental coefficients on negative stock returns being
0.15 (0.15). It is clear that the asymmetric timeliness in earnings is much stronger for financially
constrained firms for both proxies of financial constraints examined. All differences in the
sensitivities of earnings to positive versus negative shocks for financially constrained and
unconstrained firms are statistically different at the 1% level. A very similar pattern exists for the
operating cash flow regressions. 18
The results on hypotheses 5a and 5b provide supporting evidence for the effect of
investment on the timeliness properties of accounting numbers. First, investment and operating
activities exhibit a more pronounced asymmetric sensitivity to negative stock returns for
financially constrained firms. Second, sales, cash sales, earnings and operating cash flows exhibit
a similar pattern of pronounced asymmetric timeliness for financially constrained firms similar to
the results documented using the investment variables. Coupled together, these results suggest
that the asymmetric timeliness properties of accounting numbers are at least partially driven by
properties of real rather than recognition related effects.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate properties of accounting numbers such as lack of timeliness
and asymmetric timeliness from a real investment standpoint. The motivation is derived from the
basic idea that real investment and operating decisions are the fundamental drivers of accounting
numbers such as earnings and cash flows. Thus, it is logical to expect properties of investment to
directly influence the properties of accounting numbers.
I predict and find evidence that firms are able to quickly respond to negative shocks
whereas investment response to positive shocks is considerably slower. This asymmetry in the
sensitivity of investment to bad versus good news shocks will transfer similar properties between
economic shocks and outcomes of investment (sales, operating cash flows and earnings). I
18 Operating cash flow is derived using the balance sheet approach. As a robustness check, I also use CFO obtained
directly from the cash flow statement for the post-1987 period when estimating the regressions. The results are
robust to such an alternative specification.
predict and find evidence that sales and cash sales, income statement items that are likely to be
heavily influenced by real investment and operating activity and less unlikely to be affected by
asymmetric recognition related effects, are timelier in reflecting negative shocks. The investment
based framework also offers predictions about the time-series properties of sales. I predict and
find supporting evidence that positive sales shocks tend to spread out over time due to the slow
speed of investment adjustment to positive shocks whereas on the other hand, negative shocks
tend to be reflected in sales in a more immediate, complete and permanent fashion. Moreover, in
a further attempt to distinguish between a real operating effect versus a recognition based effect
on the properties of accounting numbers, I isolate the recognition related effect in the sales
number and obtain results that are consistent with the predictions of the investment model.
Cross-sectional tests lend further support to my explanation. I find that financing frictions affect
the timeliness of real investment decisions and more importantly have similar effects for the
timeliness properties of sales, operating cash flows as well as earnings.
My paper contributes to the accounting literature that examines the nature of the
association between accounting measures of performance and economic news. Prior literature
has mainly focused on how demand for accounting attributes such as objectivity, verifiability and
conservatism explain properties between economic shocks and accounting measures of
performance. Whereas recognition practices will undoubtedly be determinants of the properties
of accounting numbers, the link between properties of the fundamental determinants of cash
flows and earnings, namely investment and operating activities, and their effect on accounting
numbers has been ignored.
In summary, my findings are consistent with properties of real investment and operating
actions being strong drivers of the timeliness properties of sales, operating cash flows and
earnings. I provide a complementary explanation for the documented asymmetric timeliness of
operating cash flows and earnings where real as well as asymmetric recognition related effects
coexist in generating timely accounting measures of performance for negative shocks.
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Capext = Annual capital expenditures (data128)
ACapext = Change in annual capital expenditures
APP&E, = Change in Gross Property, Plant and Equipment (data7)
AEmpt = Change in the number of employees (data29)
Salest = Net Sales (datal2)
ASalest = Annual change in Salest
CashSales = Net Sales (datal2) adjusted for changes in Accounts Receivable (data2)
ACashSalest = Annual change in CashSales,
NIt = Net Income before extraordinary items (datal 8)
ANIt= Annual change in Nit
CFOt = Cash flow from operations derived from the balance sheet (datal8 - A WC, + datal4)
Rt = Raw annual buy and hold return calculated starting eight months before and ending four
months after the fiscal year end
Q = Tobin's Q (data6 + (data25*data199) -data60 - data74)/data6
*All variables besides AEmpt, Rt and Q are scaled by average total assets (data6t + data6t-_)/2
*AEmpt is scaled by the lagged value of the number of employees (data29t-l)
Figure 1
This diagram exhibits the path through which accounting numbers are affected by positive versus
negative demand shocks. The left side of the diagram illustrates the response path of the firm
after a positive shock. Planning, securing financing and construction are necessary before
production can take place and sales generated. Therefore, a firm that is at or near full capacity
will require time before it can realize increases in sales, CFO and earnings. The right side of the
diagram shows that there will be a more immediate negative impact on accounting numbers as a












This figure graphically represents how sales reflect positive and negative shocks under the
investment model. The response of sales to demand shocks is asymmetric in the sense that
negative demand shocks are reflected in sales in a timelier manner relative to positive demand
shocks. The reason for this asymmetry is that when the demand shock is positive, investments
and operating adjustments required by the firm in order to reach higher levels of production and
satisfy the increased demand require time to complete. On the other hand, when a demand shock
is negative, sales more immediately reflect the shock since the timing of operating adjustments is
not a determinant of the speed by which the negative shock is reflected in sales. The firm
experiences a symmetric shock to demand in the first period. When the shock is positive (dashed
line), the firm can only accommodate a small fraction of the new demand due to limited capacity
and inability to immediately implement investment. As a consequence, the positive shock is
reflected in sales over a three-period horizon. This implies a positive autocorrelation of sales
changes over subsequent periods given a positive shock. On the other hand, when the firm
experiences a negative shock, capacity constraints and the timeliness of investment adjustment
are not a determinant of the speed by which sales reflect the negative shock. The implication is
that the negative shock will be reflected in sales in a more immediate manner. Moreover, the
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The sample covers the
1970-2000 period and consists of 71,978 firm/year observations. Capext, is annual capital expenditures,
ACapex, is the change in annual capital expenditures, Capexmat is annual capital expenditures adjusted by
the trailing three year average of capital expenditures, APP&E, is the change in gross property, plant and
equipment, AEmpt is the change in the number of employees, Salest are annual revenues and ASalest is the
change in annual revenues. CashSalest are annual net sales adjusted for sales on account (accounts
receivable) and ACashSalest is the change in annual CashSales. NI, is net income before extraordinary
items and ANI, is the change in annual net income. CFO, is operating cash flow derived from the balance
sheet and Rt is the annual buy and hold return calculated starting eight months before and ending four
months after the fiscal year end. Q,t- is the lagged value of Tobin's Q. All variables besides AEmpt and R,
are deflated by average total assets. AEmpt is scaled by the lagged value of the number of employees. All
variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid the influence of outliers.

























































































Table 2. Correlation Table
This table presents Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) correlations between the main variables used in the paper.
The sample covers the 1970-2000 period and consists of 71,978 firm/year observations. Capex, is annual capital expenditures, ACapex, is the
change in annual capital expenditures, APP&E, is the change in gross property, plant and equipment, AEmp, is the change in the number of
employees, Sales, are annual revenues and ASales, is the change in annual revenues. CashSales, are annual net sales adjusted for sales on account
d-.. A 
-
alU AL•shuales, is the
months after the fiscal




annual CashS'ales. Rt is the annual buy and hold return calculated starting eight months before and ending four
Q,t- is the lagged value of Tobin's Q. All variables besides AEmpt and R, are deflated by average total assets.
ie of the number of employees. All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers.
Capex, ACapex, APP&Et AEmp, Salest ASalest CashSalest ACashSalest NIt ANIt CFO, Rt Qt-
Capext, 1 0.57 0.62 0.16 -0.06 0.14 -0.07 0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.17 0 0.08
ACapext 0.47 1 0.48 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.10
APP&Et 0.70 0.47 1 0.40 0 0.32 -0.02 0.31 0.17 0 0.10 0.03 0.11
AEmpt 0.22 0.31 0.43 1 0.02 0.44 0 0.38 0.09 0.03 -0.11 0.11 0.20
Sales, 0 0.07 0.01* 0.06 1 0.41 0.99 0.40 0.27 0.12 0.09 0.06 -0.15
ASalest 0.20 0.28 0.36 0.52 0.40 1 0.37 0.94 0.41 0.38 0.01 0.15 0.11
CashSalest -0.02* 0.06 -0.01* 0.03 0.99 0.35 1 0.38 0.20 0.05 0.13 0.05 -0.14
ACashSalest 0.20 0.26 0.34 0.46 0.39 0.93 0.37 1 0.29 0.17 0.07 0.12 0.10
NIt 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.28 0.21 0.40 1 0.41 0.76 0.16 -0.18
ANI, 0.01* 0.11 0.04 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.09 0.33 0.47 1 0.27 0.22 0
CFO, 0.26 0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.15 0 0.08 0.08 0.55 0.25 1 0.11 -0.21
R, 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.08 0.14 0.32 0.33 0.23 1 -0.06
Qt-1 0.15 0.13 0.22 0.26 -0.15 0.16 -0.15 0.15 0.23 0.07 0.05 -0.14 1
All correlations significant at the 1% level unless otherwise indicated
Table 3. Linear regressions of operating and investing variables on contemporaneous and
lagged stock returns
This table presents the results from regressions of real operating and investing decisions on
current and lagged stock returns. The sample covers the 1970-2000 period. Capext is annual
capital expenditures, ACapex, is the change in annual capital expenditures, APP&Et is the change
in gross property, plant and equipment, AEmpt is the change in the number of employees and Rt,
Rt.1, Rt-2, Rt-.3 are annual buy and hold returns for periods t, t-l, t-2, t-3 respectively. Returns are
calculated starting eight months before and ending four months after the fiscal year end. All
variables besides AEmpt and Rt are deflated by average total assets. AEmpt is scaled by the
lagged value of the number of employees. All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid
the effect of outliers. Regressions include unreported year and industry fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-
White procedure. The sample consists of 71,978 firm/year observations.
Capext ACapext APP&Et AEmpt
Intercept 0.05 -0.004 -0.003 0
(8.2) (-1.4) (-0.4) (0.3)
Rt 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.063
(7.9) (19.9) (13.1) (27.2)
Rt-i 0.0145 0.019 0.027 0.095(28.3) (39.7) (32.7) (37.7)
Rt-2 0.017 0.008 0.029 0.062
(31.9) (17.7) (37.3) (25.9)
Rt-3 0.012 0.001 0.021 0.033
(23.1) (2.8) (26.2) (14.5)
Adj R2  24.7% 7.4% 11.7% 10.3%
n=71,978
Table 4. Piece-wise linear regressions of operating and investing variables on
contemporaneous and lagged stock returns
This table presents the results from regressions of real operating and investing decisions on
contemporaneous stock returns allowing for differential coefficients conditional on the sign of
the annual stock return. The sample covers the 1970-2000 period. Capext is annual capital
expenditures, ACapext is the change in annual capital expenditures, APP&Et is the change in
gross property, plant and equipment and AEmpt is the change in the number of employees. Rt is
the annual buy and hold return calculated starting eight months before and ending four months
after the fiscal year end. Dt is an indicator variable equal to one if R<0O and zero otherwise. Qt-1,
Qt-2 is the one period lagged and two period lagged Tobin's Q respectively. All variables besides
AEmp, and Rt are deflated by average total assets. AEmpt is scaled by the lagged value of the
number of employees. All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers.
Regressions include unreported year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White procedure. The
sample consists of 71,978 firm/year observations.
Panel A. Contemporaneous investment - returns regressions
Capext ACapext APP&Et AEmpt
Intercept 0.04 -0.01 -0.017 -0.07
(6.3) (-3.26) (-1.89) (-2.85)
Rt 0 0.0036 0 0.045
(0.2) (8.33) (0.64) (14.95)
Dt 0 0 0 0.004
(0.1) (-0.7) (0.45) (1.3)
Dt * Rt 0.0126 0.016 0.042 0.106
(5.7) (9.03) (12.05) (10.66)
Qt-1 0.007 0.005 0.012 0.042
(17.8) (23.97) (24.7) (28.57)
Adj R2  22.5% 3.9% 8.56% 8.2%
n = 71,978
Table 4. (cont)
Panel B. Regressions of investment on cumulated current and last year returns
Capext ACapext APP&Et AEmpt
Intercept 0.04 0 -0.01 -0.04
(7.1) (-0.15) (-0.81) (-1.71)
R(t-l, t) 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.049
(7.7) (21.23) (10.15) (24.4)
D(t-, t) 0.001 0 0.002 0.016
(1.26) (-1.14) (1.9) (4.81)
D(t-l, t) * R(t-1, t) 0.025 0.031 0.06 0.146
(13.3) (20.35) (19.33) (18.55)
Qt-2 0.0076 0.0035 0.014 0.036
(16.2) (20.13) (22.7) (25.21)
Adj R2  23.4% 7.5% 10.3% 11%
n = 71,978
Panel C. Ratios of operating and investing activities sensitivities to negative versus positive
stock returns
Capext ACapext APP&Et AEmpt
P1 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.049
12 0.025 0.031 0.06 0.146
(P1+ P2)/ P1 8 6 11 4
f/ is the coefficient estimate on positive stock returns (R(t-1, t>0), and /f2 is the coefficient
estimate on negative stock returns (R(t-l, t) < 0) from panel B of table 4.
Table 5. Piece-wise linear regressions of operating and investing variables on
current and lagged returns
Panel A presents the results from regressions of real operating and investing activities on current and
lagged stock returns allowing for differential coefficients conditional on the sign of the stock return. The
sample covers the 1970-2000 period. Capex, is annual capital expenditures, ACapex, is the change in
annual capital expenditures, APP&Et is the change in gross property, plant and equipment and AEmp, is
the change in the number of employees. RI(,, ) is the two-year buy and hold return (period t and period t-
1) calculated starting eight months before and ending four months after the fiscal year end. D(.t-, ) is an
indicator variable equal to one if R(-, t)<0 and zero otherwise. R(.3, t-2) is the two-year buy and hold return
(period t-2 and period t-3) calculated starting eight months before and ending four months after the fiscal
year end. D(,-3, t-2) is an indicator variable equal to one if R(t-3, t-2)<0 and zero otherwise. All dependent
variables besides AEmp, are deflated by average total assets. AEmp, is scaled by the lagged value of the
number of employees. All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. The
sample consists of 71,978 firm/year observations. Panel B presents the asymmetric sensitivity of the
dependent variables to negative versus positive stock returns for the (t-1, t) and the (t-3, t-2) periods and
the difference in the asymmetric sensitivity between the two periods. Regressions include unreported year
and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are corrected for
heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White procedure. The sample consists of 71,978 firm/year
observations.
Panel A. Regressions of investment and operating variables on current and lagged stock returns
Capext A Capext APP&Et AEmpt
Intercept 0.06 0.010 0.029 0.051
(10.5) (3.9) (3.8) (2.3)
R(t-1, t) 0.0055 0.007 0.010 0.057
(13.2) (24.1) (16.3) (28.2)
D(t-, t) 0.001 0 0.002 0.015(1.3) (-1.2) (2.03) (4.68)
D(t-, t) * R(t-1, t) 0.021 0.030 0.054 0.142
(11.9) (19.64) (17.9) (17.9)
R(t-3, t-2) 0.009 0.004 0.015 0.04
(17.8) (11.93) (24.5) (22.4)
D(t-3, t-2) -0.003 -0.001 -0.006 0
(-3.57) (-1.61) (-4.9) (-0.1)
D(t-3, t-2)*Rt-3, t-2) 0.019 -0.001 0.027 -0.006
(10.35) (-1.11) (8.86) (-0.73)
Adj R2  26.2% 7.1% 12.1% 10.3%
n = 71,978
Table 5. (cont)
Panel B. Percentage change in the asymmetric investment sensitivity structure between periods(t-l, t) and periods (t-3, t-2).
Capext ACapext APP&Et AEmpt
(3f+') / P13 4.8 5.3 6.4 3.5
(P2+Y 2)/ 2  3.1 0.75 2.8 0.85
% Change 
-35% -85% -56% -75%
/f and /2 are the coefficients on R(t-1, t) and R(t-3, t-2) respectively from the regression in panel A of
table 5. yl and y2 are the coefficients on D(t-1, t) * R(t-1, t) and D(t-3, t-2)*R(t-3, t-2) respectively.
Table 6. Piece-wise linear regressions of sales activity on
contemporaneous stock returns
This table presents the results from regressions of annual sales and cash sales levels (panel A)
and sales and cash sales changes (panel B) on contemporaneous stock returns allowing for
differential coefficients conditional on the sign of the annual stock return. Panel C presents the
differences in the sensitivities of the dependent variables on contemporaneous positive versus
negative returns. The sample covers the 1970-2000 period. Salest is annual net sales deflated by
average total assets, CashSalest is annual cash sales (net sales adjusted for accounts receivable)
deflated by average total assets.'ASalest is the change in annual sales deflated by average total
assets and ACashSalest is the change in annual cash sales deflated by average total assets. Rt is
the annual buy and hold return calculated starting eight months before and ending four months
after the fiscal year end. Dt is an indicator variable equal to one if R<0O and zero otherwise.
Variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. Regressions include
unreported year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are
corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White procedure. The sample consists of 71,978
firm/year observations.
Panel A. Contemporaneous association of sales and cash sales levels with stock returns
Intercept Rt Dt Dt *Rt Adj R2
Salest 1.02 0.026 -0.016 0.24 38.4%(10.24) (4.08) (-2.07) (9.13)
CashSalest 1.03 0.016 -0.016 0.21 38.5%(10.4) (2.6) (2.1) (7.8)
n = 71,978
Panel B. Contemporaneous association of sales and cash sales growth with stock returns
Intercept Rt Dt Dr * Rt Adj R2
ASalest 0.08 0.052 -0.019 0.11
(3.11) (17.4) (-5.81) (11.51)
ACashSalest 0.09 0.039 -0.012 0.1 8.9%(2.7) (11.5) (-3.4) (9.06)
n = 71,978
Table 6 (cont)
Panel C. Comparison of sales and sales changes sensitivities to negative versus positive stock
returns
Salest CashSalest ASalest ACashSalest
P1 0.026 0.016 0.052 0.039
P2 0.24 0.21 " 0.11 0.1
(P1+ P2)/ P1 10 14 3.1 3.5
f,8 is the coefficient estimate on positive stock returns (Rt >
on negative stock returns (Rt < 0) from panel A of table 6.
0), and /2 is the coefficient estimate
Table 7. Persistence of sales and earnings changes
conditional on prior period changes
This table presents the persistence of sales, cash sales and earnings changes conditional on prior period
changes. Panel A presents the results on the time-series properties of sales growth, panel B presents the
results on the time-series properties of cash sales and panel C presents the results on the time-series
properties of earnings. Panel D compares the persistence of sales, cash sales and earnings conditional on
prior period changes. The sample covers the 1970-2000 period. ASalest is the change in annual sales
deflated by average total assets and ASalestl is the change in sales in period t-l deflated by the
corresponding average of total assets. DI. in panel A is an indicator variable equal to one if ASalest.l<0
and zero otherwise. ACashSalest is the change in annual cash sales (net sales adjusted for accounts
receivable) deflated by average total assets and ACashSalestl is the change in cash sales in period t-1
deflated by the corresponding average of total assets. Dr.1 in panel B is an indicator variable equal to one
ifACashSalest_1<0 and zero otherwise. ANIt is the change in earnings deflated by average total assets and
ANI,1 is the change in last period's earnings deflated by the corresponding average of total assets. D,.- in
panel C is an indicator variable equal to one if ANIt.<0 and zero otherwise. Variables are winsorized at
1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. Regressions include unreported year and industry fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the
Huber-White procedure. The sample consists of 63,048 firm/year observations.
Panel A. Persistence of sales growth conditional on prior period sales growth
Intercept ASalest-1  Dt-1 Dr.1 * ASalest., Adj R2
ASalest 0.01 0.27
(0.6) (37.3)
ASalest -0.01 0.36 -0.01 -0.30 14.6%(-0.44) (33.7) (-2.15) (-15.68)
n = 63,048
Panel B. Persistence of cash sales growth conditional on prior period cash sales growth
Intercept ACashSalest.; Dr-1  Dt-1 * ACashSalest.. Adj R2
ACashSalest 0.03 0.19
(1.2) (18.2)
ACashSalest 0.03 0.24 -0.02 -0.16 12.7%(1.1) (12.3) (-4.1) (-6.8)
n = 63,048
Table 7 (cont)
Panel C. Persistence of earnings growth conditional on prior period earnings growth
Intercept ANltI. Dt-1  Dr-1 * ANIt.1  Adj R2
ANIt 0.01 -0.27
(0.6) (28.9)
ANIt -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.50 11%(-4.03) (-5.8) (-17.4) (-20.26)
n = 63,048
Panel D. Persistence of sales, cash sales and earnings growth conditional on prior period growth
Y = Sales Y = Cash Sales Y = NI
f,(A Y I A Yt>O0) 0.36 0.24 -0.08
li+ /2, (AYt I AYt 1 <O) 0.06 0.08 -0.58
fl/ and ,2 are the coefficient estimates from the following model:
A Yt = a + Po (Dr.t-) + ,81 (AYt.) + 82 (Dt-j *AYt-1) + e ,
where Y represents either sales, cash sales or net income, Dt-I is equal to one ifA Yt_. <0 and zero
otherwise.
Table 8. Piece-wise linear regressions of investment on contemporaneous stock returns.
Partitions by financing constraints
This table presents results from regressions of operating and investing variables on contemporaneous stock returns allowing for differential
coefficients conditional on the sign of the stock return. The Payout partition covers the 1970-2000 period whereas the Debt Rating partition covers
the 1985-2000 period. Firms are classified as financially constrained if they fall in the bottom three deciles of the payout ratio ranking. Firms are
considered to be financially unconstrained if they fall in the top three deciles of the payout ratio ranking. The payout ratio is calculated as the sum
of dividends and stock repurchases for the year deflated by average total assets. For the Debt Rating partitioning scheme, firms are considered
financially constrained if they have long-term debt outstanding but there is no credit rating on the firm. Firms with long-term debt outstanding and
a credit rating are considered to be financially unconstrained. Capext, is annual capital expenditures, ACapext is the change in annual capital
expenditures, APP&E, is the change in gross property, plant and equipment and AEmp, is the change in the number of employees. R, is the annual
buy and hold stock return calculated starting eight months before and ending four months after the fiscal year end. D, is an indicator variable equal
to one ifR, < 0 and zero otherwise. All variables besides AEmp, and Rt are deflated by average total assets. AEmpt is scaled by the lagged value of
the number of employees. Variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. Regressions include year and industry fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White procedure.
Panel A. Operating and investing variables regressions
Partition: Payout Partition: Debt Rating
Capext Intercept R, Dt Dt *Rt Q,- Intercept R Dt Dt *Rt Qt-1
Constrained 0.042 0 -0.002 0.012 0.007 0.04 0 0.001 0.018 0.008
(4.9) (-0.1) (-1.9) (3.9) (12.6) (4.6) (0.2) (0.8) (5.9) (14.5)
Unconstrained 0.03 0.003 0 -0.013 0.007 0.035 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008
(2.5) (2.6) (0.6) (-2.6) (10.2) (3.1) (-0.9) (1.1) (0.2) (7.4)
Difference -0.003** 0.025*** 0.001 0.0179***
*, ** * * denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively
Table 8 (cont)
Partition: Payout Partition: Debt Rating
ACapext Intercept Rt Dt D,*R, Qt-1 Intercept Rt Dt Dt*Rt Qt-1
Constrained -0.005 0.0027 -0.002 0.023 0.005 -0.01 0.003 0 0.016 0.005
(-1.1) (3.3) (-1.9) (7.8) (15.8) (-1.8) (4.6) (0.1) (6.1) (16.7)
Unconstrained -0.01 0.006 -0.001 -0.01 0.0046 -0.01 0.003 0.002 0.006 0.006
(-2.7) (5.6) (-1.2) (-2.6) (13.4) (-2.7) (1.6) (0.9) (1.1) (9.1)
Difference -0.0033*** 0.033*** 0 0.01*
APP&Et Intercept R, D, Dt *Rt, Q- Intercept Rt Dt D *Rt, Q-1
Constrained -0.02 -0.001 -0.002 0.05 0.011 -0.01 0.001 0.001 0.049 0.013
(-1.5) (-0.9) (-1.1) (9.1) (17.2) (-0.8) (0.9) (0.8) (9.1) (18.9)
Unconstrained -0.008 0.005 0 -0.007 0.012 0.02 0.001 -0.003 0.001 0.015
(-0.5) (2.5) (0.3) (-0.9) (14.1) (1.5) (0.3) (-0.9) (0.1) (9.1)
Difference -0.006*** 0.057*** 0 0.048***
AEmpt Intercept Rt Dt Dt*R, Qt- Intercept Rt Dt Dt*Rt Qt-I
Constrained -0.05 0.035 -0.006 0.17 0.041 -0.03 0.042 0 0.13 0.045
(-1.4) (7.9) (-0.9) (11.2) (19.7) (-0.6) (8.4) (-0.2) (8.1) (18.8)
Unconstrained -0.08 0.057 0.003 -0.02 0.032 -0.007 0.04 -0.004 -0.06 0.043
(-2.3) (6.9) (0.6) (-1.1) (15.8) (-0.2) (3.3) (-0.5) (-1.7) (10.2)
Difference -0.022*** 0.19*** 0.002 0.19***
*, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively
Table 9. Piece-wise linear regressions of sales, earnings and cash flows on contemporaneous stock returns.
Partitions by financing constraints
Panel A of this table presents results from regressions of sales and sales changes on contemporaneous stock returns allowing for differential coefficients
conditional on the sign of the stock return. The Payout partition covers the 1970-2000 period whereas the Debt Rating partition covers the 1985-2000 period.
Firms are classified as financially constrained if they fall in the bottom three deciles of the payout ratio ranking. Firms are considered to be financially
unconstrained if they fall in the top three deciles of the payout ratio ranking. The payout ratio is calculated as the sum of dividends and stock repurchases for the
year deflated by average total assets. For the Debt Rating partitioning scheme, firms are considered financially constrained if they have long-term debt
outstanding but there is no credit rating on the firm. Firms with long-term debt outstanding and a credit rating are considered to be financially unconstrained.
Sales, are annual sales and ASales, is the change in sales. Rt is the annual buy and hold stock return calculated starting eight months before and ending four
months after the fiscal year end. D, is an indicator variable equal to one if Rt < 0 and zero otherwise. All variables besides R, are deflated by average total assets.
All variables are winsorised at 1% and 99% to avoid the effect of outliers. Panel B presents results from piece-wise linear regressions of earnings and operating
cash flows on contemporaneous stock returns across the payout and the debt rating partitions. Regressions include unreported year and industry fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White procedure.
Panel A. Sales and sales changes regressions
Partition: Pavout Partition: Debt Rating
Salest Intercept R, Dt Dt*Rt Intercept R, Dt Dt*R,
Constrained 0.9 0.016 -0.004 0.26 1.3 0.007 -0.014 0.29
(7.7) (2.1) (-0.3) (8.2) (8.9) (0.9) (-1.2) (8.3)
Unconstrained 1.08 0.09 0 0.048 1.46 0.01 -0.04 0.07
(6.8) (4.9) (-0.6) (0.8) (4.7) (0.5) (-2.5) (1.1)
Difference -0.074*** 0.212*** -0.003 0.22***
ASalest Intercept R, Dt Dt*Rt Intercept R, Dr Dt*Rt
Constrained 0.13 0.043 -0.02 0.15 0.16 0.04 -0.02 0.13
(2.9) (10.1) (-3.7) (10.7) (2.9) (9.4) (-4.4) (9.3)
Unconstrained 0.08 0.081 -0.01 0.007 0.2 0.025 -0.025 0.01
(2.1) (10.5) (-2.3) (0.3) (2.6) (2.8) (-3.6) (0.3)
Difference -0.038*** 0.143*** 0.015 0.12***
Table 9 (cont)
Partition: Payout Partition: Debt Rating
CashSalest Intercept Rt Dt Dt*Rt Intercept Rt Dt Dt*Rt
Constrained 1.04 0.026 0.025 0.17 1.31 0.019 -0.01 0.19
(6.9) (2.7) (1.6) (4.14) (8.9) (1.9) (-0.61) (4.6)
Unconstrained 1.09 0.073 -0.006 0.018 1.56 0 -0.04 0
(6.7) (3.7) (-0.4) (0.28) (4.5) (-0.04) (-2.4) (0.06)
Difference -0.047** 0.152** 0.019 0.19**
ACashSalest Intercept Rt Dt Dt*Rt Intercept Rt Dt Dt*R,
Constrained 0.1 0.031 -0.01 0.14 0.1 0.03 -0.015 0.134
(2.1) (6.04) (-1.43) (7.83) (1.93) (6.1) (-2.6) (7.73)
Unconstrained 0.09 0.064 -0.006 0.024 0.23 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(2.3) (8.12) (-1.2) (1.04) (3.1) (1.23) (-3.8) (0.37)
Difference -0.033*** 0.116*** 0.02* 0.124***
Panel B. Earnings and operating cash flow regressions
Partition: Payout Partition: Debt Rating
NIt Intercept R, Dt Dt*Rt Intercept Rt D, D *R,
Constrained -0.07 0.001 0.01 0.27 -0.046 -0.01 0.01 0.33
(-2.8) (0.7) (2.1) (29.8) (-1.6) (-4.6) (3.9) (33.8)
Unconstrained 0.06 0.014 0.008 0.15 0.07 0 0.002 0.15
(4.5) (5.5) (3.9) (12.6) (5.6) (-0.4) (0.9) (14.7)
Difference -0.0139*** 0.12*** -0.01*** 0.18***
Table 9 (cont)
Partition: Payout Partition: Debt Rating
CFOt Intercept Rt Dt Drt*Rt Intercept Rt Dt Dt*Rt
Constrained -0.03 -0.004 0.004 0.2 0 -0.014 0.007 0.26
(-1.2) (-1.8) (1.4) (22.3) (-0.1) (-5.9) (2.3) (26.8)
Unconstrained 0.1 0.009 0.006 0.15 0.1 -0.001 -0.001 0.13
(5.7) (2.8) (2.4) (12.6) (7.1) (-0.3) (-0.5) (11.9)
Difference -0.013*** 0.05*** -0.0139*** 0.13***
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively
